Terrorism is a technique, not an enemy state that can be defeated

Jonathan Steele
Saturday November 22, 2003
The Guardian



The bombast has increased with the bombs. We saw two disturbing
escalations this week. The explosions that devastated the British
consulate and the HSBC bank in Istanbul mark a significant widening in the
choice of targets by those Islamist radicals who use terror to express
their hatred of British and US policy in Iraq and the Middle East. The
Blair/Bush response reached an equally alarming new level of ferocity.

At their swaggering joint press conference on Thursday, the two men
repeatedly made the risible claim that they could win their war on terror.
The prime minister was the worse. While Bush gave himself a global carte
blanche to intervene anywhere, by speaking of his "determination to fight
and defeat this evil, wherever it is found", Blair put the issue in terms
of a finite goal. He talked of defeating terrorism "utterly" and "ridding
our world of this evil once and for all".

The hyperbole of the religious pulpit allows for all-embracing and
eschatological language, but these men are meant to be practical political
leaders. When Blair, in his opposition days, invented the phrase "tough on
crime, tough on the causes of crime", he knew that crime could never be
totally eliminated. The task is to reduce and restrain it by a variety of
methods. Violence and terrorism are no different. Like poverty, they will
always be with us. At best they can only be diminished and contained. Yet
now, with the arrogance of power, we have the Bush/Blair roadshow
promising in sub-Churchillian tones to vanquish terrorism as though it
were a clearly defined enemy like Nazi Germany.

Terrorism is a technique. It is not an ideology or a political philosophy,
let alone an enemy state. Our leaders' failure to understand that point
emerged immediately after September 11 2001 when they reacted to the
attacks in New York and Washington by confusing the hunt for the
perpetrators with the Afghan "state" that allegedly "harboured" them. The
Taliban ran avicious regime, but Afghanistan was a disastrously failed
state and its nominal leader, Mullah Omar, had no control over al-Qaida.

By the same token the "war" on terror should have remained what it
initially was, a metaphor like the "war" on drugs. But instead of being
harmless linguistic exaggeration to describe a broad campaign encompassing a range of political, economic and police counter-measures, it was narrowed down to real war and nothing else. The slippery slope that began with Afghanistan quickly led to the invasion of Iraq, a symbolic and
political enormity whose psychological impact Bush and Blair have not yet
grasped.

When Ariel Sharon, then a middle-aged general, wanted to send Israeli
tanks into Cairo in October 1973, it was the arch-realist Henry Kissinger
who realised how devastating the emotional effect would be in the Arab
world, and stopped him. For a new generation of Arabs, the sight of
American tanks in Baghdad is just as humiliating. Osama bin Laden's claim
that having US forces at airbases close to the Islamic holy places in
Saudi Arabia is a desecration appealed only to a few Muslims, but the
daily television pictures of US troops in the heart of an Arab capital,
and not just patrolling but using lethal force to back up an
administration of occupiers, inflames a much larger audience.

Jack Straw argues that terrorism preceded the war on Iraq and it is
therefore wrong to blame the US and Britain for increasing the danger.
This is a non-sequitur, which also flies in the face of the evidence,
admitted by US officials themselves, that non-Iraqi Arabs have been
infiltrating Iraq to commit acts of terror because of the US presence.

Sharon, similarly, says suicide bombings in Israel started before he took
office. Does that mean he shares no blame? That is not the view of four
former Israeli intelligence chiefs, who argued last week that Sharon's
exclusive reliance on hardline responses has weakened Israel's security
and increased the number of attacks on Israelis.

Before the war on Iraq several of Britain's intelligence experts,
including senior officials, warned that it would increase the risk of
terrorism and make British interests potential targets - a view shared by
most critics of the war. To suggest they were wrong runs against common
sense.

Coming after the war on Afghanistan, the war on Iraq has made al-Qaida's
grisly work easier. Dispersed by American bombing from their remote
mountain lairs, they have shifted to the much easier terrain of an urban
Arab environment where they can be more readily hidden and helped.
Resistance to US forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan as well as
terrorist attacks on aid workers and other western soft targets are on the
increase, but they appear to come from Afghan supporters of the former
Taliban as well as other Pashtun radicals from Pakistan. Most Arabs who
were in Afghanistan have moved to Iraq. There they have been joined by new Arab recruits, eager to add their energy to Iraq's local resistance.

In the long history of terrorism, al-Qaida has provided two novelties. One
is its global reach, marked by willingness to strike targets in many
countries. The other is its use of suicide attacks as a weapon of first,
rather than last, resort. Under the broad heading of terrorism as a
political and military instrument, suicide bombing is a sub-category, a
technique within a technique.

In the post-colonial world its first proponents had nothing to do with the
anti-Islamic myth that martyrs are motivated by the hope of being greeted
by dozens of virgins waiting in heaven. It began with Hindu Tamils in Sri
Lanka, an act of martial self-sacrifice by angry women as well as men.
When it spread to Palestine over the past decade, it was an act of
last-resort desperation by frustrated people who saw no other way to
counter Israel's disparity of power, as Cherie Blair once publicly pointed
out. Al-Qaida has merely taken an old technique and made it the weapon of choice.

The shock this week is that Bush and Blair not only still believe that war
is the way to deal with terrorists but that even when faced by the
escalation of Istanbul they think victory is possible. The real issue is
how to control risk. Anti-western extremism will never be eradicated, but
it can be reduced by a combination of measures, primarily political.

The first is an early transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people and the
withdrawal of foreign forces. An arrangement whereby the new Iraqi
government "requests" US troops to stay on will convince few in the Middle
East. Second is firm and sustained pressure on Israel to make a deal with
the Palestinians, presumably on the lines of the recent accord worked out
in Geneva by Israeli and Palestinian dissidents.

There is no guaranteed defence against a suicide attack on a soft target.
"Hardening" targets by turning every US or British building, at home or
abroad, into a fortress makes little sense. It is better to try to reduce
the motivations (hatred, revenge, or an overwhelming sense of injustice)
that make people turn themselves into bombs. That endeavour will also
never produce complete success. In Blair's misguided words, it cannot be
done "utterly" or "once and for all". But it is the more productive way to go.


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